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Abstract
The world is currently experiencing a pandemic that has infected 154 million people, and killed
3.22 million, not taking unreported cases and deaths into account. World leaders are being
thrown into making decisions that will decide the fates of their country’s population and perhaps
to some leaders, something even more important, their economy. Economic activities have been
brought to nearly a standstill with some countries imposing tight restrictions on movement in an
attempt to halt the spread of COVID-19. As the virus feeds off of human proximity, a large part
of the service industry has been affected. The goal of this paper is to explore the effects from the
COVID-19 pandemic on employment in the food service and accommodations industries within
the United States, with focus on examining employment due to it being one of the most
important factors in determining a country’s economic health. In doing so, this paper breaks
down industry structures and employment demographics to observe how different industry
structures react to the pandemic.
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Introduction
All world economies share the goal of achieving high employment. In order to keep an
economy strong, consumers must spend on goods and services. Because the majority of the
population earn spending money through employment, an important goal to any economy is to
make jobs available to everyone who wants one. Therefore, high employment within any country
is an indicator of a strong economy. During times of economic prosperity, employment is high,
likewise, during times of economic downturn, unemployment rises. What the COVID-19
pandemic brought was an external shock to the global economy, forcing social distancing
measures in order to contain the spread of the virus. Through the shock, employment levels were
severely impacted throughout all industries, especially in the service industries. From restaurants
to modes of public transportation, live musical performances to tourism, businesses and
industries have seen significant drops in revenue and are threatened with the possibility of
shutting down. Such an impact on revenue is reflected heavily in the drop of employment rates
across the globe. This paper examines the impact of the pandemic on employment of the food
service and accommodation industries in the United States and finds that both the food service
industry and accommodations industry consisted of similar demographics that were vulnerable to
the employment impact of the virus, seeing only slight differences in independent businesses,
which was made exasperated by the lack of a properly organized and distributed PPP aid from
the government.

Chapter 1 focuses on empirical data on both industries, providing industry comparisons
on demographic data. Upon determining the employment structure of both industries, the chapter
then looks at the impact of the pandemic on employment and follows the industries during the
6

COVID-19 economic collapse. Chapter 2 introduces the Paycheck Protection Program and
examines loan distribution statistics in relation to demographic and business type data. It begins
to shed light into the imbalance of loan distribution and discuss problems faced by businesses in
the food service and accommodations industries caused by the PPP. Chapter 3 then dives into the
flaws of the Paycheck Protection Program and critiques the policies that make up the program
before providing what would be a more long-term and impactful government relief for the most
vulnerable businesses in need of aid.

7

CHAPTER 1: The Food Service Industry and Accommodation Industry
1.1

Overview of the Industries

The Food Service Industry is a relatively large industry within the United States and has been
steadily growing in size since the 1960’s. Amassing up to a 26% market share of total food
expenditures in 1960, commercial foodservice establishments totaled up 54.8% in market share
by 2019. The entire food marketing system, including food service and food retailing, supplied
roughly $1.77 trillion worth of food in 2019. Of this total, $969.4 billion1 was generated by
commercial foodservice establishments, which accounts for full-service restaurants, fast food
outlets, caterers, some cafeterias, and other places that prepare, serve, and sell food to the general
public for profit. The two largest components within the commercial foodservice market are the
full-service and fast-food restaurants, which account for about 73.1% of all food-away-fromhome sales in 2019. The National Restaurant Association reports restaurants (full-service
establishments) to be America’s second-largest private sector employer, providing jobs for one in
ten Americans2. In December 2019, BLS data reported that the Food Service industry employed
a total of 12,210,300 Americans.
Compared to the Food Service Industry, the Accommodations Industry is significantly smaller
in terms of market size and employment. Although the United States takes up 40% of the global
hotel market (making it the country with the largest hotel market), the industry according to
Statista is estimated to hold only a market size of $198.34 billion3 and employed 2,109,800

1

USDA ERS - Market Segments. (2020, June 4). USDA. https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/food-markets-prices/foodservice-industry/market-segments/
2
National Statistics. (2020). National Restaurant Association. https://restaurant.org/research/restaurantstatistics/restaurant-industry-facts-at-a-glance
3

Statista. (2021, March 16). U.S. hotel and motel industry market size 2011–2021.
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1170216/hotel-and-motel-industry-market-size-
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Americans in December 2019.4 In terms of employment, the Food Service Industry employs
roughly 6 times the number of Americans as the Accommodations Industry.
Figure 1.1.1. Employment Level by Industry5

Employment by Industry (In Thousands)
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Figure 1.1.1 shows the number of employees in both industries from January 2006. Aside from
the 2008 Great Recession and the current COVID-19 pandemic, in accordance with an
increasing number of food service establishments, employment numbers in the food service

us/#:%7E:text=U.S.%20hotel%20and%20motel%20industry%20market%20size%2020112021&text=The%20market%20size%20of%20the,of%20195.33%20billion%20U.S%20dollars.
4

BLS. (2021). All employees, thousands, accommodation, seasonally adjusted
https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/CES7072100001?amp%253bdata_tool=XGtable&output_view=data&include_graphs
=true
5

BLS. (2021). All employees, thousands, accommodation, seasonally adjusted
https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/CES7072100001?amp%253bdata_tool=XGtable&output_view=data&includ
e_graphs=true

BLS. (2021b). All employees, thousands, food services and drinking places, seasonally adjusted.
https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/CES7072200001?amp%253bdata_tool=XGtable&output_view=data&include_graphs
=true
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industry have been steadily rising whilst the Accommodations industry has experienced rather
constant employment numbers. Simply looking at employment numbers, the food service
industry during the 2008 Great Recession seemed to experience a longer duration of lower levels
of employment before showing signs of recovery compared to the accommodations industry.
Food Service employment numbers began decreasing at the end of 2008 and only began showing
signs of increase in the end of 2011. The accommodations industry, compared to the food service
industry, experienced a very insignificant drop in employment during the 2009 recession and
underwent almost a full recovery by 2010. The COVID-19 pandemic impacted both industries
in March 2020 dropping both industry employment levels down by half, and although, at this
point in time, the economy is not showing signs of full recovery, the accommodations industry
seems to show more stable employment levels while the food service industry seems a little more
volatile with its slight dip in employment in January 2021. A labor force comparison of both
industries is presented in Figure 1.1.2. The figure shows that the food service industry has more
labor force fluctuations and was more impacted in April 2020 than the accommodations
industry. Labor force dropped drastically in the food service industry, before making almost a full
recovery, and proceeded to decrease from July 2020 to January 2021.

10

Figure 1.1.2 Labor Force by Industry6
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COVID-19 created a massive disruption in the labor force, greater than that of the 2008 Great
Recession, with the food service industry showing more rapid signs of people leaving the labor
force than the accommodations industry. Between March 2020 and April 2020, more than 30%
of employees in the food service industry left the labor force compared to a 17% decrease in the
accommodations industry’s labor force. However, the following month, between April 2020 and
May 2020, the accommodations industry experienced an additional 10% drop in its labor force
while the food service industry’s labor force increased by 20%. Compared to the COVID-19
pandemic, there were minimal disruptions in the labor force during the 2008 Great Recession.

6

Authors calculations based on footnotes 4 and 6
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Figure 1.1.3 Unemployment Rate by Industry7
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Figure 1.1.3 presents data on the unemployment rates of both industries. Data shows that
unemployment rates within the two industries are seemingly similar and follow the same trend.
Both industries experienced higher rates of unemployment during the 2008 Great Recession, and
maximum highest rates of unemployment during April 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Although the unemployment rates of neither industry are immune to economic slowdowns, the
Accommodations industry seems to be more volatile and susceptible to sudden and more drastic
fluctuations in employment. This could perhaps be explained by the drastically seasonal nature
of the industry. Lowest rates of unemployment in the Accommodations industry align with the

7

BLS. (2021c). (Unadj) Unemployment Rate - Nonagricultural Private Wage and Salary Workers, Accommodation.
https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNU04034259?amp%253bdata_tool=XGtable&output_view=data&include_
graphs=true

BLS. (2021d). (Unadj) Unemployment Rate - Nonagricultural Private Wage and Salary Workers, Food Services and
Drinking Places.
https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNU04034262?amp%253bdata_tool=XGtable&output_view=data&include_
graphs=true
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summer as traveling and tourism are at their highest then, and during off-peak season, are higher
due to decreased demand. More fluctuation in unemployment can also be attributed to lower
fluctuation in labor force in the accommodations industry in Figure 1.1.2. However, comparing
the Accommodations industry to the Food Service industry during times of economic crisis, it is
apparent that even during economic recessions, the accommodations industry has a higher level
of fluctuation and presents signs of quickly decreasing unemployment rates whilst the food
service industry takes longer to decrease its unemployment rates. Higher fluctuation in
employment suggests that the industry is either more volatile and susceptible to economic
change or is better equipped for a faster recovery. This is further demonstrated by the pandemic’s
impact on unemployment in 2020. Both industries experienced highest levels of unemployment
during April 2020, and although the accommodations industry reached unemployment figures at
13.5% higher than the food service industry, data shows that the accommodations industry seems
to be undergoing a steeper decline of unemployment between September 2020 and February
2021. This further suggests that the employment in the accommodations industry recovers faster
than the food service industry, despite its seasonal nature. An explanation to the absurdly high
unemployment rates to the Accommodations industry can also be explained through our
examination of the Labor Force. As unemployment is calculated through the number of
unemployed divided by the labor force, the unemployment rate can hide information when it
comes to those who have left the labor force. In actuality, the food service industry also
experienced very high levels of unemployment, however, it was not accounted for in the
unemployment rate because a massive amount of people left the labor force in April 2020.
(Figure 1.1.2)
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1.2

Employment Breakdown of Industries by Gender

A further breakdown of employment by gender in both industries is given in Figures
1.2.1 and 1.2.2. Figure 1.2.1 breaks down employment by gender in the food service industry.
Figure 1.2.1 Breakdown of Gender in Food Service Industry8

Food Service Employment by Gender
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Looking at data taken from 2018 to present, there are consistently more females employed in the
food service industry than males and showed small signs of growth before the impact of the
pandemic. Male employment remained steady throughout 2018 to 2020 before also taking a
plunge in April 2020. As Figure 1.2.1 shows, female employment dropped at a higher rate but

8

BLS. (2021e). Women employees, thousands, food services and drinking places, seasonally adjusted.
https://beta.bls.gov/dataViewer/view/timeseries/CES7072200010
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also recovered at a slightly faster rate than male employment. An annual rate of change in
employment analysis in Figure 1.2.2 confirms our observations that female employment in the
food industry grew at a faster rate than male employment since 2018, was impacted harder in
April 2020, but almost consistently experienced lower rates of change in employment compared
to the change in male employment.
Figure 1.2.2 Employment Rate of Change by Gender in Food Service Industry9
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The accommodations industry has a far greater number of female employees than male
employees. Figure 1.2.3 breaks down the accommodations industry by gender.

9

Authors calculations using data from footnote 7
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Figure 1.2.3 Breakdown of Gender in Accommodations Industry10
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In comparison to the food service industry, the accommodations industry does not suggest a onesided growth in employment rate. Both genders face equally stable employment levels and show
no obvious signs of growth since 2018. In periods where there presented small fluctuations of
growth in female employment, there were also signs of fluctuation in male employment. This is
confirmed in the annual employment rate of change by gender analysis, shown in Figure 1.2.4,
done on the accommodations industry. Annual rate of change is conducted to account for the
seasonal nature of the industry, as mentioned in Chapter 1.1.

10

BLS. (2021f). Women employees, thousands, hotels and motels, except casino hotels, seasonally adjusted.
https://beta.bls.gov/dataViewer/view/timeseries/CES7072111010
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Figure 1.2.4 Employment Rate of Change by Gender in Accommodations Industry11
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Figure 1.2.4 demonstrates that during the pandemic, both genders, in April 2020, underwent the
exact same negative rate in change in employment, and although there are periods of imbalance
between the employment rate between the two genders, one gender is not consistently presenting
higher rates of negative change. In comparing Figure 1.2.4 to 1.2.2, it is apparent that
employment by gender before the pandemic was more equal within the accommodations
industry, as both genders experienced positive rates of change, and that the accommodations
industry also experienced a more balanced and equal rate of employment change by gender
during the impact of the pandemic.
As data taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics demonstrate, the pandemic affected the
employment within the food service and accommodations sector to a much greater extent than

11

Authors Calculations using data from footnote 9
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the 2008 Recession. Where unemployment rates did not exceed 15% during the Great Recession,
they shot to almost 50% in the accommodations industry and 35% in the food service industry.
This 35% does not represent the real rate of unemployment caused by the decrease in the
accommodation industry’s labor force. Similar to how the 2008 Great Recession affected
employment in many male dominated industries such as manufacturing, construction, and the
financial industry, the employment drop related to social distancing measures has a large impact
on sectors with high female employment shares. The Institute for Women’s Policy Research
released a report in April 2020 revealing that of the 701,000 jobs lost, 58.8% represented jobs
were lost by women, with the majority of lost jobs in the Leisure and Hospitality industry.12 “The
Impact of COVID-19 on Gender Inequality in the Labor Market and Gender-Role Attitudes” by
Reichelt, Makovi, and Sargsyan, analyzes why such a phenomenon exists. Taking employment
surveys and data from the United States, Germany, and Singapore, the study revealed that the
differences in unemployment probabilities are largely due to women’s pre-COVID employment
situation.13 Such includes their higher likelihood of working part-time. As “atypical work
arrangements combined with poorly unionized occupations in an industry where seniority does
not play a large role, women are therefore the first to get laid off”.14 Additionally, gender
differences in unemployment are associated with more fine-grained gender differences in the

12

Hegewisch, A. (2020, July 25). Women Lost More Jobs than Men in almost all Sectors of the Economy. IWPR
2020. https://iwpr.org/iwpr-issues/employment-and-earnings/women-lost-more-jobs-than-men-in-almostall-sectors-of-the-economy/

13

Malte Reichelt, Kinga Makovi & Anahit Sargsyan (2021) The impact of COVID-19 on gender inequality in the
labor market and gender-role attitudes, European Societies, 23:sup1, S228S245, DOI: 10.1080/14616696.2020.1823010
14

Why the U.S. Economic Downturn Could Hurt Women More. (2020, April 21). Knowledge@Wharton.
https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/economic-downturn-hurt-women/
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labor market, e.g men’s and women’s occupations or industries.15 “COVID-19’s Impact on the
US Labor Market as of September 2020”16 by Erica L. Groshen studies the recovery process of
the labor market after the April 2020 period. The study concludes that as of September 2020,
female workers have the highest share of disruptions in the form of leaving the labor force and
reporting that they do not want a job. This phenomenon is consistent with “expanded childcare
and family responsibilities” created by the pandemic.17 Therefore, although the economy shows
signs of recovery, it is unlikely that all female employees will return to the workforce as quickly
as male employees due to the fact that the pandemic has altered the current system of living and
added to the responsibilities of women.

1.3

Employment Breakdown of Industries by Race

Both industries have similar demographics in terms of race. Figure 1.3.1 presents data
taken from BLS on the demographics of both industries during a snapshot of 2020. As the figure
demonstrates, 39% of the food service industry is made up non-white employees, and 42% of the
accommodations industry is made up of non-white employees. Both industries have a smaller
percentage of Asians in the workforce, and larger participation of Hispanic and Black
employees.

15

Malte Reichelt, Kinga Makovi & Anahit Sargsyan (2021) The impact of COVID-19 on gender inequality in the
labor market and gender-role attitudes, European Societies, 23:sup1, S228S245, DOI: 10.1080/14616696.2020.1823010
16

Groshen, E. L. (2020). COVID-19’s impact on the U.S. labor market as of September 2020. Business Economics,
55(4), 213–228. https://doi.org/10.1057/s11369-020-00193-1

17

Groshen, E. L. (2020). COVID-19’s impact on the U.S. labor market as of September 2020. Business Economics,
55(4), 213–228. https://doi.org/10.1057/s11369-020-00193-1
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Figure 1.3.1 Ethnical Demographics in Both Industries18
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Time series data on employment level by race on BLS only covers the food service industry.
Figure 1.3.2 shows the impact on employment levels before and after the 2020 impact of the
pandemic within the food service industry. Different from what is seen in the breakdown of
industries by gender, there is no pattern in uniformity to employment by race. Where White
employment levels rise in June 2019, there is decrease in Black employment, stability in Asian
employment, and also rise in the Hispanic employment. Where White employment levels drop in
August 2019, there is increase in Black employment, increase in Asian employment, and a
decrease in Hispanic employment. Therefore, there seems to be no correlation in employment
level fluctuations among races. Figure 1.3.2 represents employment level recovery during
economic recessions. Prior to April 2020, all races fluctuate slightly within reason in
employment levels. Just before the massive impact of April 2020, White, Hispanic, and Asian

18

BLS. (2020b). Employed persons by detailed industry, sex, race, and Hispanic or Latino ethnicity.
https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat18.htm
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employment undergo slight drops in employment before all races plummet in employment
during April 2020. White and Hispanic employment levels decrease at a faster rate compared to
Black and Asian employment, but that can be credited to its higher participation rate in the
industry. What stands out, however, is the recovery in employment in May 2020.
Figure 1.3.2 Recovery in employment by Race19
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While White employment levels show signs of recovery immediately at a significant rate before
reaching approximately 50% by June 2020, Hispanic employment levels remain flat and
unchanging for a month before showing signs of recovering and finally recovering 50% of its
employment level in July 2020. Black employment shows further decline in employment

19

BLS. (2020). Employed - Hotel, motel, and resort desk clerks, Percent of employed by occupation by Race.
https://beta.bls.gov/dataQuery/find?st=0&r=20&more=0&fq=cg:[Demographics++Characteristics+of+People]&q=hotel+

BLS. (2020b). Percent distribution - Employed in food preparation and service related occupations by Race.
https://beta.bls.gov/dataQuery/find?st=0&r=20&more=0&fq=cg:[Demographics++Characteristics+of+People]&q=food+service%20employed
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throughout the month of May 2020 before also reaching is 50% recovery point also in July 2020,
and signs of recovery among Asians simply do not exist until August 2020. Furthermore, White
employment show signs of further recovery throughout June 2020 to November 2020 whilst
other races show signs of employment decline. When Hispanic and Black employment levels
dropped slightly between July and August, White employment remained stable, and Asian
employment still has not seen its initial sign of recovery. While BLS does not provide
comprehensive data on time series demographics within the accommodations industry, with its
similar 2020 snapshot data provided in Figure 1.3.1, the paper assumes that the pandemic impact
of employment level in the accommodations industry would show a similar trend with the food
service industry. The same literature review of “Covid-19’s impact on the US labor market as of
September 2020”20 by Erica L. Groshen further concludes that of the different demographics
categorized by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, male and white workers continue to fare better
than any other demographic category. Groshen uses the terminology “faring better” to describe
“fewer job [disruptions] and/or that more workers whose jobs have been disrupted retain a tie to
an employer”.21 Specifically examining the racial demographic, Groshen’s study finds that jobs
held by white workers have been less disrupted than jobs held by African American or Hispanic
workers, and they recovered faster between April and June. Furthermore, in accordance with
Figure 1.3.2, African American and Hispanic workers have seen much less improvement in
disruptions than white workers, and along with high death rates from the pandemic, these two
groups of American workers have seen particularly dire labor market impacts from COVID-19.

20

21

Groshen, E. L. (2020). COVID-19’s impact on the U.S. labor market as of September 2020. Business Economics,
55(4), 213–228. https://doi.org/10.1057/s11369-020-00193-1
Groshen (2020)
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Additionally, Groshen distributes employees into categories of job disruptions. Figure 1.3.3 is
taken from Groshen’s calculations from BLS data and demonstrates the disruption in the labor
force as of September 202022.
Figure 1.3.3 Job Disruptions as of September 2020 by Demographics23

The first three color coded categories in Figure 1.3.3 represent labor force disruptions that
preserve the relationship between worker and employer. Examining the racial aspect of labor
force disruptions, the share of disrupted African American workers retaining a tie to an employer
is the smallest, (41%) of any group, and the share of disrupted African American workers who
want a job, but who have not actively looked for work yet, is also the highest of all demographic
groups (19%), which “suggests the presence of continuing barriers to job searches” (Groshen
2020) in this demographic group. Although in contrast to African Americans, Asian workers
have the highest rate of workers with continuing ties to employers and the smallest share of
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disrupted workers who have left the labor force (19%), they hold the largest share of furloughed
employees (48%).

1.4

Recovery Prospects

Although the economy has seen signs of recovery after the massive April 2020
disruption, there is no guarantee that employment in both industries will return to original levels
in the foreseeable future. Employment by August 2020 had recovered to the same levels as
November 2011 in the wake of the Great Recession, however, the pandemic has proven to be the
most “unequal recession in modern U.S. history, delivering a mild setback for those at or near
the top and a depression-like blow for those at the bottom”24. Although this is often the case in
any type of economic recession, the impact of the pandemic on employment is on a scale that is
the worst in generations. While the United States has regained nearly half of the jobs lost, several
key demographic groups have recovered more slowly, as discussed in sections 1.2 and 1.3. These
demographics include mothers of school-age children, Black men, Black women, Hispanic men,
Asian Americans, younger Americans, and people without college degrees. The recession has
brought upon inequality that is a reflection of the pandemic itself, in which the pandemic has
caused more deaths in low-income communities.25 Data taken from the CDC point out that
serious illness resulting from COVID-19 “disproportionately affects people in communities of
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color, due to the underlying health and economic challenges that they face. Similarly, adults with
low incomes are more likely to have higher rates of chronic conditions compared to adults with
high incomes, which could increase their risk of serious illness if infected with coronavirus.”26
The food service industry and the accommodations industry both employ more females than
males, with the accommodations industry having a much larger gap than the food service
industry. However, the food service industry employs more than six times the number of female
employees than the accommodations industry, accounting for a much larger portion of the total
labor force. Additionally, both industries are made up of a substantial portion of non-white labor
force participants and are low-income earners. Of American labor force participants between the
ages of 18-64, 44% are low-wage workers,27 in which almost half of these low-wage jobs are
concentrated in just 10 different occupations. Included in these lowest paying occupations are
cooks and food preparation workers, building cleaners and janitors, and food and beverage
servers. Figure 1.4.1 demonstrates the gap between low-income workers and supervisors within
the food service industry.
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Figure 1.4.1 Share of Supervisory vs non-Supervisory Employees – Food Service28
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As Figure 1.4.1 demonstrates, much of the food service industry is constituted of low-income
employees. According to BLS, of the 8,158,170 workers in the food service industry in 2019,
only 818,040 were supervisors or managers. While supervisors and managers see a rather
consistent level of employment, lower-level employees within the food service industry
experience higher levels of fluctuation, change, and volatility. The employment impact of the
pandemic caused both levels of occupations to fall drastically, but signs of recovery can be seen
almost immediately. Comparing food service occupations with the accommodations industry in
Figure 1.4.2, it can be observed that the accommodations industry sees more stability in both
supervisory and non-supervisory occupations.
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Figure 1.4.2 Share of Supervisory vs non-Supervisory Employees – Accommodations29
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However, recovery within the accommodations industry lacks in speed and certainty. What can
be described as an almost immediate recovery process within the food service industry is not
seen in the accommodations industry. Rather, employment levels continue dropping until May
2020 before showing slight recovery at a much slower rate than the food service industry.
Although the food service industry is showing better signs of recovery compared to the
accommodations industry, it is important to note who are the employees obtaining employment.
With structural changes in responsibility among women, and higher mortality rates among
workers of color, it can be deduced that the majority of recovered employment is given to white
males. Another aspect to consider has to do with the education level of workers in both
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industries. Unlike other industries, the food service and accommodations industries do not
require high levels of education. “The Structure of Teenage Employment: Social Background
and the Jobs Held by High School Seniors” by Charles Hirschman and Irina Voloshin analyze
the composition of student employees by industry. The study discusses the existence of niches in
teenage jobs where adolescents comprise a significant share of all workers in an occupation or
industry, and teenage workers are “the mainstay of fast-food establishments” (Hirschman,
Voloshin 2007). The study takes data from the 2005 Current Population Survey and finds that of
the 141 million employed persons in the United States in 2005, a little over 4% are teenagers.
Over three-quarters of these teenage high school seniors are employed in two major occupational
categories: “Service” and “Sales and Office”. However, a further inspection done by Hirschman
and Voloshin showed only one occupational category that could be labeled as a teenage niche—
food preparation and serving. Approximately “4 out of every 10 teenagers work in [the food
preparation and serving] occupational specialty”30.
A 2019 breakdown of occupation by age taken from BLS shows the population of
college students within the food service and accommodations industry. Of the 11.2 million total
workforce, approximately 4 million are between the ages 16-24, meaning that 36% of the
workforce of both industries is comprised of college students. With a large workforce
composition of females, people of color, and college students, it is expected that occupations in
both industries would constitute of low wages. Figure 1.4.3 compares average wage in both
industries.
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Figure 1.4.3 Industry Wage31 Comparison
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Average wage in the food service industry is lower than the accommodations industry and
relatively more stable. However, both industries demonstrate low levels of hourly wage.
Finally, employment can only be recovered if there is an institution that can provide
employment. However, businesses themselves have been severely impacted from the physical
social distancing caused by the pandemic. According to the National Restaurant Association, six
months following the first shutdown of restaurants, nearly 1 in 6 restaurants (representing nearly
100,000 restaurants) is closed either permanently or long-term.32 Therefore, pre-existing gender,
race, and educational wage inequality, in addition to the larger health related issues and effects of
the pandemic on the lower class, and the fact that many businesses are permanently closed, make
for more a more difficult recovery process in both industries.
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See footnote 28
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CHAPTER 2: Government Response and Policy
2.1

The Cares Act

The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES) was an over $2
trillion economic stimulus bill passed by the 116th United States Congress and signed into law by
President Donald Trump on March 27, 2020. The stimulus bill was in response to the economic
fallout caused by the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States and was intended to speed relief
across the American economy. It was the third aid package from Congress and was meant to
keep businesses and individuals afloat during an unprecedented freeze on the majority of
American life. Lawmakers referred to the CARES act as “Phase 3” of Congress’s coronavirus
response. The first phase was an $8.3 billion bill spurring vaccine research and development,
enacted on March 6th, 2020. The second phase was an approximately $104 billion package
largely focused on paid sick leave and unemployment benefits for workers and families, enacted
on March 18th, 2020. After being apparent to Congress that phase 1 and 2 were insufficient, a
much larger third package, which was to become the CARES Act, was negotiated.
Unprecedented in size and scope, the CARES Act was the largest economic stimulus
package in US history, amounting to 10% of total US GDP, even larger than the $831 billion
stimulus act passed in 2009 as part of the response to the Great Recession. The bill targeted
seven main groups that would see the widest-reaching impacts: individuals, small businesses, big
corporations, hospitals and public health, federal safety net, state and local governments, and
education. Figure 2.1.1 gives a visual demonstration of the distribution of emergency relief to
these seven groups.
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Figure 2.1.1 Funding Distribution of the CARES Act33
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Individuals were set to receive the most funds, an estimated $560 billion34 based on bill
text, committee and administration numbers. This emergency relief fund included several
elements aimed at helping keep people engaged in the economy via direct cash for many, plus
expanded unemployment benefits. Cash payments were estimated to total $300 billion whereas
most individuals earning less than $75,000 received a one-time cash payment of up to $1,200,
and families of four earning less than $150,000 received up to $3,400. In addition to cash
injections, the CARES Act also provided approximately $260 billion dedicated to unemployment
assistance, increasing the benefits and broadening those who were eligible. This portion of the
bill made major changes to increase unemployment payments provided by states and added $600
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per week lasting for 4 months from the federal government on top of whatever base amount an
employed American would receive from the state. Additionally, the legislation also added 13
weeks of unemployment insurance, meaning people nearing the maximum number of weeks
allowed by their respective states would get an extension. For self-employed Americans who
could not file for unemployment, this legislation also created a new, temporary Pandemic
Unemployment Assistance program to help Americans who lost work as a direct result of the
public health emergency. Finally, the bill required all private insurance plans to cover COVID19 treatments and vaccine and made all coronavirus tests free.
The second largest group of beneficiaries in the CARES Act were dedicated to big
businesses, in which Congress set aside roughly $500 billion in loans. These companies were
required to pay the government back and were subject to public disclosures and other
requirements. Roughly $58 billion was allocated to the airline industry dedicated to cover
employee wages, salaries, and benefits. The bill also established a fully refundable tax credit for
businesses of all sizes that were closed or distressed to help them keep workers on the payroll
with the intention of getting employees hired back or placed on paid furlough to insure they have
jobs to return to.
The third largest group of benefactors in the CARES Act was small businesses, receiving
roughly $377 billion in emergency relief. Small businesses were offered emergency grants and a
loan program. The biggest difference between the bill’s attitude towards big and small businesses
was the fact that small businesses were capable of applying for loan forgiveness. Of the $377
billion fund relief fund, $350 billion was allocated towards forgivable loans, $17 billion was
relief for existing loans, and $10 billion was allocated towards emergency grants. Relief for
existing loans covered six months of payments for small businesses already using SBA loans,
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and the emergency grants provided up to $10,000 per small business to cover immediate
operating costs. The forgivable loans, also known to be the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP)
was implemented by the Small Business Administration (SBA) with support and funding from
the Department of the Treasury.

2.2

The Paycheck Protection Plan

Section 1102 of the CARES Act temporarily permitted SBA to guarantee 100% of loans
under the program titled the Paycheck Protection Plan.35 The PPP provided small business with
funds to pay up to 8 weeks of payroll costs including benefits. Small businesses borrowed up to
2.5 times their average monthly payroll costs, or a maximum of $10 million. The program was
designed to help fund payroll costs, including benefits, and also helped pay for mortgage interest,
rent, utilities, worker protection costs related to COVID-19, uninsured property damage costs
caused by looting or vandalism during 2020, and certain supplier costs and expenses for
operations.36 The loans had an interest rate of 1% and neither the government nor lenders could
charge small businesses any fees. Loans issued prior to June 5th, 2020, had a maturity of two
years, and 5 years after June 5th, 2020.
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Loan forgiveness was provided and issued if all employee retention criteria were met,
and funds were used for eligible expenses. In order to meet criteria, funds received from the PPP
must have been used for eligible payroll costs, payments on business mortgage interest
payments, rent, or utilities, under the condition that payroll costs were exhausted within a period
of 56 days37 (8 weeks). Employee and compensation levels must have been maintained, with a
minimum of 60%38 of PPP proceeds spent on payroll costs. Nonpayroll costs were eligible for
loan forgiveness if paid during the covered period or if incurred during the covered period and
paid on or before the next regular billing date, even if said date is after the covered period.
Finally, applications for loan forgiveness could only be accepted after all loan proceeds were
exhausted.
As of 2021, two rounds of PPP loans have been distributed. The first round of PPP,
which opened to small businesses on April 3rd, 2020, originally included $349 billion in funding.
This funding, which intended to cover eight weeks of payroll costs, including mortgage interest,
utilities and rent expenses, was depleted in less than two weeks. The second round of PPP loans
received an additional $320 billion in funding and contained a few key differences from the first
round of PPP loans. The biggest change to round 2 of the PPP distinguished between first and
second draws, meaning that some businesses that previously received a PPP loan could receive a
second one. Qualifications for businesses looking to receive a second draw were more strictly
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regulated, however, as the second round of loans were intended to target small businesses that
have been most devastated by the economic fallout. While first draw requirements remained
relatively similar as the first round of PPP loans, the second round of PPP loans required that
firms demonstrated revenue reduction of at least 25%39 in at least one business quarter. Publicly
traded companies became ineligible for the loan, and companies with more than 300 employees
were no longer considered to be part of the targeted struggling businesses. Funding amounts also
differed from the first round of PPP loans. First draw applicants were still set at 2.5 times
monthly payroll, or a maximum of $10 million, however, the second draw was capped at $2
million. More attention was given to businesses within the accommodations and food service
industries where businesses in these industries could borrow up to 3.5 times their monthly
payroll (assuming this amount isn’t greater than $2 million). Loan forgiveness requirements
remained the same, meaning at least 60% of the PPP loan must be spent on payroll expenditures
to retain staff and employees, however, the remaining 40% of the loan added more qualifying
expenses within loan forgiveness. In addition to expenditures on rent, utilities. etc., non-payroll
loan expenditures were expanded to include software expenditures, necessary supplier costs,
fixing property damage from protests, and personal protective equipment and barriers for
reducing COVID transmission.
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2.3

First Round PPP Loans

The Small Business Administration provided data40 regarding the first round of PPP
loans. According to the report, a total of $342,277,999,103 loans were approved through April
16, 2020 for the PPP loan, supporting a total of 1,661,367 businesses. Figure 2.3.1 demonstrates
the percentage each category of loan recipients received from the net loan.
Figure 2.3.1 PPP Distribution by Percentage of Funding Amount41
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Loans between the size of $350K to $1M received the largest percentage of PPP loans, capturing
23.56% (over $80 billion), followed by loans between $2M to $5M, capturing 18.79% (over $64
billion). However, these two loan size categories only accounted for less than 10% of those who
received loans. Of the approximate 1.6 million businesses that received the first round of PPP
loans, 161,763 businesses received approximately 42% of the total funds. In contrast, loans
$150K and under accounted for 74% of the businesses that applied, and only received 17% of
PPP funds (approximately $58 billion). Roughly 6% of America’s small businesses were
included in the loan count, in which 74% of those small businesses received less than $150,000
in relief.42 The report also broke down PPP loans by industry. Construction,
Professional/Scientific/Technical Services, Manufacturing, and Health Care and Social
Assistance Industries received the most in funding, amounting to 49.3% of the total PPP fund.
The food services and accommodations industry ranked 5th in terms of PPP loans received and
reported a total of 161,876 approved loans (9.7% of net loans), receiving a total of
$30,500,417,573 (8.9% of net amount). State-wide PPP favoritism was evident whereas the top
six states: California, Texas, New York, Florida, Illinois, and Pennsylvania received over 38% of
all PPP loans funds.43
Although the government poured over $350 billion into the PPP program, businesses that
were in dire need of a loan were not able to access it. The National Federation of Independent
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Businesses (NFIB) conducted surveys44 of the first round of PPP loans recipients and found that
as of March 30th, 2020, 60% of small business owners had not yet contacted their bank or other
financial institution about available credit or lending resources due to the COVID-19 outbreak.
Additionally, a survey conducted on April 17th, 2020, the day after both the PPP and EIDL
(Economic Injury Disaster Loan) programs ran out of funding, revealed that many small business
employers were still in the process of applying for the loan, and most self-employed owners were
still waiting for banks to begin accepting non-employer business applications. Roughly threequarters of small business owners submitted applications for a PPP loan during the first round,
but only one-in-five of submitted applications were fully processed with funds deposited in the
borrower’s account, leaving the other 80% waiting, many not knowing where they are in the
process. There were many issues with the PPP loans.45 Firstly, the rapid installation of the PPP
loan program made for a poorly organized system in which many banks were unable to pull off
the program in such a short amount of time. Large national banks had technical issues and
scrambled last minute to set up the application process. In addition, the SBA didn’t approve
every FDIC bank and credit union to distribute loans, only limiting institutions that were SBAlicensed lenders. To small business owners, this translated into being forced to go to a different
bank to apply for a loan. This proved to be a huge problem due to the fact that these lending
banks were already overwhelmed with the volume of applications to the point where they started
prioritizing their own customers. This poorly developed system caused many business owners
who truly needed funds – those with only enough cash to cover a few weeks’ worth of expenses
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– from being able to apply. Additionally, errors plagued the financial institutions around the
country in getting acceptable PPP loan applications to the SBA. Initial application forms missed
out on important data points that were needed to submit the applications, and ever-changing loan
requirements led to many business owners’ applications being returned by the SBA. All these
issues resulted in approximately 28 million46 business owners not receiving cash in their
accounts. The situation was even worse for self-employed people, as they were only able to
apply for the loan a week after47 the program opened, putting them well behind other businesses
in the first-come, first-served program.
In contrast to these small businesses, it became apparent that a large number of bigger
businesses were benefiting from the PPP loans. Although the PPP was created to allow any
business with less than 500 employees to receive loans, discrepancies within the text allowed for
larger businesses that operate with fewer employees in separate locations, under a franchise
model, to also receive loans. Within the food service industry, Shake Shack, a franchise that
holds roughly $104 million in cash and liquid assets, and employs nearly 8,000 people in its 189
restaurants, received $10 million in loans from the SBA. Other businesses, with a net worth in
the billions, also successfully received large PPP loans. Analysis48 on the biggest recipient of the
PPP loan provided by Wall Street Journal showed that the CEO of Ashford Inc. (a publicly
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traded hospitality real estate company) managed to receive nearly $60 million in PPP loans after
successfully applying for dozens of loans through subsidiary companies.
Loan distribution inequality was rampant during the first round of PPP. SBA data49 on
businesses that have received loans revealed that the majority of total loans issued was
distributed to bigger businesses, and only 28% of funds were used for loans of less than
$150,000, which would have gone towards small businesses. In addition, a large percentage of
minority, women-owned, and rural small businesses did not receive loans under the PPP because
the SBA did not instruct lenders to prioritize underserved communities. The program initially
relied on traditional banks to deliver loans, resulting in banks favoring50 existing customers and
disfavoring microbusiness (business with fewer than 10 employees), non-employer businesses,
and Black- and Latino- or Hispanic-owned businesses. As data provided by the SBA did not
require demographic information, there lacked transparency in the determination of whether
funds went to underserved communities as the program was intended to. Due to this lack in
transparency, this paper borrows loan distribution data from Bloomberg. Figure 2.4.1 shows
Bloomberg’s analysis between April 3rd to 16th on the limited SBA data regarding demographic
loan data.
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Figure 2.3.1 Round One PPP Loan Distribution, Minority vs White51

It is apparent that the PPP stimulus provided relief to predominantly white parts of the country in
its first two weeks of operation, leaving firms in mostly Hispanic and Black areas to wait until a
second tranche of funds was made available. According to Figure 2.3.1, in the first round of the
PPP in April 2020, 27% of businesses in congressional districts with a majority of non-Hispanic
White residents received loans, compared to 17% in districts where minorities make up more
than half the population. In the 36 majority-Hispanic districts, only 15% of firms were able to tap
into the $349 billion of available funds before running out in two weeks. Other methods of
bypassing the lack of transparency from SBA and examining racial distribution inequality in PPP
loans can be done through other data retrieved from loan applications. While the SBA did not
collect demographics on business owners, it did provide, for over 5 million borrowers, data
regarding the ZIP codes, loan approval dates, and lender type, creating a comprehensive picture
of small business access to loans on a neighborhood scale. Combining previous research done by
the JPMorgan Chase Institute which found that businesses in communities of color were the most
cash-constrained but the least likely to have existing relationships with large banks, Brookings52
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analysis on Treasury Data concluded that this precondition systematically delayed access to PPP
loans in majority-minority neighborhoods. Figure 2.3.2 shows that on average, majority-Black
ZIP code businesses took 31 days to receive PPP loans – seven days longer than businesses in
majority-White communities.
Figure 2.3.2 Loan Approval Time (in Days) by Racial Neighborhood 53

This duration was even more exaggerated for non-employer businesses, where there existed a
nearly three-week loan delay between the racial communities. Other methods of examining the
access of minority groups to PPP loans is through correlating the number of loans to the share of
small local banks within a region. The ILSR (Instituted for Local Self-Reliance) published a
statistical report54 and found that a significantly larger number of loans were reaching small
businesses in states where small, local banks comprised a greater share of the market, compared
to states where big banks were more dominant. Surveys from ILSR have found that businesses
owned by people of color have been much less likely to secure relief loans. Aside from the factor
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and long-standing pattern of racial discrimination in bank lending, another explanation towards
this phenomenon is the fact that communities of color have fewer local banks. The ISLR, in
research not yet published, has found that counties with a higher share of African American
residents have lost nearly half55 of their small community banks since 2006. a much steeper
decline in local banks than other counties. Although this problem could be offset by internetbased technologies that allowed for more efficient loan processing and lower transaction costs,56
albeit with higher interest rates, online lenders were not made eligible to issue PPP loans until
April 14th, two days before funds ran out.

2.4

Second Round PPP Statistics

The second round of PPP lending injected an additional $320 billion into the program
after the first round was depleted in 2 weeks. Operating with the same intentions, the second
round was refilled on April 27, limited second draw businesses through maximum receivable
value, and reduced employment size to 300. Unlike the first round of PPP loans that was
depleted in two weeks, the second round still had $130 billion in funds gone unclaimed nearly
seven weeks after its launch. SBA data57 summarizing the second round of PPP loans determines
that there was a total of 2,571,167 loans approved summing to a total of $188,943,588,568.
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Unlike the first round of PPP loans where a disproportionate percentage of funds were handed
over to larger companies, the second loan demonstrated slightly better distribution percentages in
which a larger percentage (20%) of total funds were received by small businesses. This was
manifested in the average loan size of the second PPP round, sitting at $73,000, compared to
$206,000 in the first round. The data from the second round of PPP loans was more
comprehensive and also included data on lenders. Banks valued at over $50 billion in assets
provided over 50% of loan amounts, followed by banks with less than $10 billion in assets,
providing over 30% in assets. However, the efficiency of this second round of PPP loans was
also debated, raising the question of why businesses were not applying for the loan.
The second round of PPP loans introduced an additional requirement in order to qualify
for loan approval. In order to ensure that funds only went to businesses that were most adversely
affected and most in need of support from the government, eligibility for the new round of PPP
loans required for businesses to show that their revenue dropped by 25%58 or more during 2020.
Despite the good intentions of policymakers, this revenue reduction requirement blocked many
businesses from the crucial relief that they needed to continue operating by failing to account for
the additional costs of running a business during COVID-19. Rising costs are not accounted for
in revenue reports, and a second PPP loan would be crucial for these businesses to prevent
furloughing their staff. This revenue reduction requirement prevented 44% of small businesses
from applying for a second-draw PPP, including 42% of businesses in especially hard-hit
industries (retail, food and beverage, tourism, and arts and entertainment).
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Other factors that halted businesses from applying for the second PPP loan included the
lack of clarity of loan forgiveness from the first round of loans. Studies59 have found that 56% of
small businesses had yet to receive loan forgiveness from round one PPP loans, and nearly 25%
of business owners had huge concerns regarding loan forgiveness preventing them from applying
for loans as it would be nearly impossible to repay loans if they are not forgiven. Loan
forgiveness also variated by race. Figure 2.4.1 borrows data from Gusto and shows loan
forgiveness inequality within demographics of business owners.
Figure 2.4.1 Unforgiven Loans by Race60
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Whilst all demographics experienced high rates of unforgiveness, Black and Asian business
owners showed a higher percentage of unforgiven loans from the first round of PPP loans,
further discouraging them from taking additional loans from the second round of PPP. Although

59

Kerrigan, K. R. L. (2021, March 15). Why Aren’t Struggling Small Businesses Taking More PPP? Entrepreneur.
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/366797#:%7E:text=A%20top%20reason%20cited%20by,forgiveness
%20for%20a%20second%20loan.

60

Kerrigan, K. R. L. (2021)

45

small businesses were not rushing to apply for the second round of PPP loans, distribution of
loans towards businesses in majority-minority neighborhoods did see improvement compared to
round one. Borrowed data from Bloomberg compares the second-round loan distribution by
demographics in Figure 2.4.2 to the first round shown in Figure 2.3.1.
Figure 2.4.2 Round Two Loan Distribution61

As the figure demonstrates, the second round of PPP loans revealed a much better demographic
distribution. 75.1% of small businesses in majority-minority congressional district received PPP,
compared to 72% in majority white districts through June 30th. Further analysis in Figure 2.4.3
comparing round one and round two of loans by state shows even more drastic differences in
loan recipients by demographics.
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Figure 2.4.3 The Change of Lending Patterns in Reaching More Diverse Districts62
[Blue dots: Round one; Yellow Dots: Round two]

Figure 2.4.3 differentiates the percentage of small businesses that received PPP loans versus the
minority share of a congressional district’s population. Blue points depict round one of loans,
whilst yellow points depict round two. As the figure demonstrates, large lending discrimination
was present in the first round of loans where percentage of loans approved decreased in majorityminority communities. This was corrected drastically in the second round. The second round of
loans had an inversed relationship where higher minority populated areas also received larger
amounts of PPP loans.
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The second round of PPP loans were seemingly fairer in its distribution, with data
suggesting that more of the loans were going to smaller businesses. However, “Did the Paycheck
Protection Program Hit the Target?” by Jaoa Granja, Christos Makridis, Constantine Yannelis,
and Eric Zwick 2020 discover that “fifteen percent of establishments in the regions most affected
by declines in hours workers and business shutdowns received PPP funding; in contrast, thirty
percent of all establishments received PPP funding in the least affected regions”.63 The paper
considers the two dimensions of program targeting: did funds flow to where the economic shock
was greatest, and the role of banks in mediating policy targeting. Granja. Makridis. Yannelis, and
Zwick find little evidence that funds were targeting towards geographic regions more severely
affected by the pandemic. Rather, the paper finds that the opposite is true, and funds were
targeted towards areas less severely affected by the virus. This phenomenon was made possible
by Banks determining who received funds and when their applications were ultimately
processed, resulting in regions with higher exposure to banks that performed well seeing higher
levels of PPP lending, and quicker application processes.

2.5

PPP Impact on the Food Service and Accommodations Industries

Although the PPP stimulus was meant to keep employees on payroll and support small
businesses, its execution created the question of its effectiveness in the food service and
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accommodations industries. Latest SBA data64 regarding PPP loans throughout 2020 show that
of a net $525 billion, only 8.09% ($42.4 billion) was successfully allocated to the
Accommodations and Food Service Industries, making this figure, in relation to the number of
jobs lost in the food service and accommodations industry, largely disproportionate. Industry
payroll and employment share data65 for businesses operating with fewer than 500 employees
taken from the 2017 Census Statistics of US Businesses indicate the balance of distribution
between share of PPP loans versus small business employment share in different industries. The
Accommodation and Food Services Industry section in the Census reports a 14.11% small
business employment share, and a 5.81% small business payroll share, while only receiving
approximately 8% of PPP loans, making it the industry that holds the largest disparity in terms of
PPP loans. Although insufficient data from the Treasury Department and SBA additionally make
for a difficult examination of details behind food service institutions receiving loans, data reveals
that major chains with private-equity investors (such as PF Changs’s, Shake Shack, and Silver
Diner), received millions in loans, suggesting a large amount of inequity demonstrated by the
SBA in its providing of loans to businesses catering to elite clientele, firms owned by foreign
companies, and large chains backed by Wall Street firms. The first come first serve distribution
system of the loans, therefore, did not evaluate the relative need of the recipients, and is
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responsible for nearly 90,000 companies66 receiving loans without the promise of using funds to
keep employees on payroll.
The Department of Labor reported a total of 20.567 million net jobs lost in April 2020, a
quarter of which was associated to the Food Service industry itself due to low revenue and
government-mandated lockdowns. (Refer to Figure 1.1.1 where employment levels in the food
service industry dropped from 11.6 million in March to 6.3 million by April). Revenue in
October 2020 fell significantly compared to October 2019, more so in full-service restaurants.
Figure 2.5.1 distinguishes types of restaurants that experienced the largest decreases in revenue
using data from the National Restaurant Association.
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Figure 2.5.1 Food Service Sales by Restaurant Type68
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Out of the four categories of restaurants, franchised limited-service restaurants reported
to be doing better with the lowest percentage of operators reporting lower sales in 2020, along
with a less impacted average percent change in sales (-14%). Restaurants that have been
impacted the most, on the other hand, are full-service restaurants, with an average percent
change in sales of -36%. Revenue changes are reflected directly in employment and staffing
data69 conducted in November 2020 where 62% of fine dining restaurants were operating at over
20% below normal staffing, compared to just 29% in quick service restaurants. This gap in
impact on revenue is partly due to the food delivery system.
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With restrictions forcing food service institutions to close indoor dining options, a large
number of restaurants pivoted to home delivery or curbside pickup in order to stay afloat and
keep employees on payroll. This dependency on the food delivery system can be reflected in the
industry’s market revenue in 2020. The food service industry experienced a massive growth in
revenue in the year 2020. Limited data collected from Statista, shown in Figure 2.5.2, reveals an
annual average of 20% increase in revenue between 2017 and 2019, and a 27% revenue jump
between 2019 and 2020.
Figure 2.5.2 Global Food Delivery Revenue 70
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The pivot to food delivery is a method for food service businesses to keep employees on payroll
and stay afloat. As food service employment level data shows in Figure 1.1.1, employment has
not fully recovered, and show signs of decrease between November 2020 and January 2021. The
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initial rise in employment after April 2020 can be attributed to the introduction of the PPP loans,
food delivery revenue, and the slow return of seated restaurant diners. However, the lack of
properly targeted PPP loan distribution to restaurants in dire need of loans, in addition to the fact
that the number of seated diners is impacted on a seasonal level, places a larger emphasis on
retaining employees via food delivery revenue.
The food delivery system is not an equally simple solution to all restaurants, however,
and is better suited for fast food or casual dining institutions, compared to fine dining
institutions, as food quality is affected by delivery and certain menus are simply unsuitable for
delivery. In order to adjust, fine dining institutions have adapted into simpler and more low-cost
menus. As this is not a feasible or accomplishable option for all full-service restaurants, there is a
higher number of loss of staffing in full-service restaurants compared to limited-service
restaurants. Figure 2.5.3, using survey data taken from the National Restaurant Association
compares employment loss in different types of restaurants. As expected, quick service
institutions were better affiliated to depend on the food delivery for revenue in comparison to
formal dining institutions.
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Figure 2.5.3 Food Service Staffing Compared to Non-COVID levels71
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Between mid -March and July, restaurants using food delivery services increased by 27%72 and
became a method to help some restaurants stay afloat. However, it is not a sustainable solution as
food delivery services are extremely expensive. The food service market is dominated by 4
companies that control 98%73 of all restaurant sales. In exchange for the wider customer base
provided in this oligopoly, some platforms charge restaurants as much as 30% in commissions
and fees per order. This, in addition to the already slim profit margins caused by lockdown,
social distancing regulations, and limited capacity, is not a solution that many restaurants can
afford, especially for independent restaurants. Whilst fast food and chained restaurants have pre-
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existing infrastructure in place or are better equipped to adopt drive-through’s, independent
restaurants reliant on dine-in sales are unable to keep up.
The hotel industry, as one of the first industries to see massive drops in demand, did not
receive the aid it needed to recover. The paper takes survey data from AHLA and provides the
statistics of the first round of PPP loans, hotel closure, and furlough levels as of September 2020.
Figure 2.5.4 compares hotel loan application rates to loan approval rates in April 2020.
Figure 2.5.4 Hotel Loan Application vs Approval Rate74
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As Figure 2.5.4 shows, a total of 97.5% of hotels in the United States applied for loans. Of this
figure, 48% applied for both PPP and EIDL loans, but only 9% of businesses received both
loans. 66% of PPP loan applications were accepted, and 21% of hotels did not receive
government aid. Additionally, AHLA reports the median loan amount received by hotels to be
valued at $150,000, 25% lower than the overall average loan size of the first round of PPP loans
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of $206,000 reported by the SBA. In order to measure the effectiveness of the PPP loans, this
paper looks at job loss in the hotel industry in May. Data75 collected from AHLA demonstrates
that 84% of hotels have unemployment workers as of May, with only 37% of businesses able to
rehire or return any employees through PPP loans. Insufficient data makes for a difficult
calculation of just how many hotel jobs were recovered due to PPP loans, however, post-April
employment levels provided in Figure 1.1.1 in addition to AHLA survey data stating that 66% of
hotels are operate at less than 50% of pre-COVID staffing levels suggests that the PPP loans had
little effect in preserving employment within the industry. Failure to retain employees can,
similar to the food service industry, be attributed to PPP loan size and requirements. Covering
only roughly 8 weeks of payroll, with short windows of complete expenditure in order to meet
forgiveness standards, a RevPAR (revenue per available room) lower than the global financial
crisis in 2009,76 and an increase in pandemic safety requirement costs, 59% of hotels reported
being in danger of losing their property to foreclosure by November 2020. Figure 2.5.5 tells the
story of an increasing number of hotels anticipating closure and further layoffs between
September and November without additional or proper government aid.
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Figure 2.5.5 Hotels without Governmental Aid77
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By September 2020, the hotel industry loss a total of 871,065 direct jobs (Figure 2.5.6),
California accounting for 12.4% alone, and loss a total of 57,180 hotels due to closure. These
figures account for already issued government aid loans, and act as a further testament to the lack
in ineffectiveness of the PPP loan in its mission of keeping employees on payroll.
Figure 2.5.6 Hotel Job Losses by September 202078
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Unlike the food service industry, the hotel industry does not have an alternative method
in generating revenue and can only rely on taking safety measures in attracting guests. However,
there is a distinction between types of businesses that are being impacted the most by the
pandemic. Contrary to the food service industry where independent restaurants are seeing the
most closures and layoffs, independent hotels significantly outperformed79 hotels affiliated with
franchise brands in the 2020 pandemic. Figure 2.5.7 and 2.5.8 compares occupancy, ADR
(average daily rate), and RevPAR (revenue per available room) between independent businesses
with soft franchised brands and hard brands during the 2020 pandemic.
Figure 2.5.7 Occupancy in Independent vs Branded Hotels80
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Figure 2.5.8 Comparing Revenue in Independent vs Branded Hotels81
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Figures 2.5.7. and 2.5.8 show that not only did independent hotels have 10% higher occupancy
rates than franchised soft brands during the crisis, but independent hotels also reported the
highest average daily rates and revenue per available room. Patterns of independent hotels
significantly outperforming hotels affiliated with franchises is not a new phenomenon and
extends to even the 2009 financial crisis. Theories82 that could explain this phenomenon include
the freedom independent hotels have to execute creative strategies without brand restrictions, the
freedom to achieve higher average daily rates (ADRs), and demographic and psychographic
shifts in which the traveling public favour independent hotels over the generic alternatives of
hard brands and franchise soft brands. Therefore, within two industries that share very similar
employment demographics, independent restaurants are in greater danger of business closure due
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to their inherent inability to be flexible to the necessary changes required to survive the
pandemic, whilst independent hotels are inherently more advantageous in being flexible in
adapting to survive the pandemic.
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Chapter 3: Policy Revision
3.1

Change in Administration

The Biden-Harris administration in 2021 made additional changes to the PPP loans with
the intention of delivering equitable relief to hard-hit small businesses a top priority.83 Several
additional reforms were announced to further direct the PPP loans to the smallest businesses and
those that have been left behind in previous loan efforts. Specifically, the Biden-Harris
administration, in January 2021, instituted a 2-week period during which only businesses with
fewer than 20 employees could apply for loans. As smaller businesses struggle more to collect
the necessary paperwork and secure relief from a lender, this 2-week exclusive application
period policy was meant to focus on serving such businesses. In addition to an exclusive
application period, the new efforts of the administration also included additional aid for small
businesses in the form of tax deductibility for expenses covered by the PPP loans, as well as tax
credits for firms that kept their employees on payroll and simplified forgiveness for loans under
$150,000. In terms of lending institutions, the SBA and Treasury staggered84 the reopening of
the new set of PPP loans, creating an opportunity to allow only community financial institutions
(banks and credit unions that lend in low-income communities) to initiate loan applications on
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opening day. This resulted in an increase of nearly 60%85 in funding going to small businesses
with fewer than 10 employees (compared to 2020 loans), an increase of nearly 30% going to
small businesses in rural areas, and an increase of over 40% in funding distributed through
community financial institutions and minority institutions.
A loan breakdown for 2021 PPP loans provided by SBA shows that of the total 1,918,663
loans approved as of February 21, 2021, 1,560,95886 loans were dedicated towards businesses
with 10 or fewer employees. Figure 3.1.1 sorts demographic data by number of loans by race and
net amount.
Figure 3.1.1 2021 PPP Loans approved by Race87
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Although data from SBA exhibits a certain degree of success in 2021 PPP loans reaching smaller
businesses, demographic data, however lacking, does not suggest a similar degree of care in
ethnic distribution. The paper analyzes loan amount distribution while not accounting for
“unanswered” data in order to examine loan distribution equality and presents its findings in
Figure 3.1.2.
Figure 3.1.2 Share of Loans vs Dollars Received by Race88
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Figure 3.1.2 shows, with the available data, that there is a discrepancy in loans approved and Net
Dollars Received as White loan applicants received 53% of approved loans but 64% in Net
Dollars Received and Black loan applicants received 18% of approved loans but only 8% in net
Dollars received. Compared to White and Black loan applicants, American Indians received 4%
in both approved loans and net amount, Asians received 12% in approved loans and 11% in net
amount, and Hispanics received 14% in approved loans and 13% in net amount, further
highlighting the disparity between number of approved loans for black applicants versus loan
amount received.
Although there exists a disparity in net loan amount by race, the Food Service and
Accommodations industry received a large increase in 2021 PPP loans received compared to
previous rounds. SBA data89 reported the Accommodation and Food Services industry to be the
largest recipient of loans, having obtained 18% of funding. In addition to a greater percentage of
PPP loans received by the industry, the Biden-Harris administration in 2021 realized the
American Rescue Plan, which established a $28.6 billion Restaurant Revitalization Fund. This
fund, opening in May 2021, will be aimed solely at the industry, administered by the SBA to the
hardest-hit small restaurants. Unlike the PPP loans, the considerable pool of assistance funding
in the Revitalization Funds are grants that are not taxable as income90 and forsake the concept of
expenditure requirements, allowing funding to be spent on a wide array of operating expenses
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and provide a much larger leeway. The Revitalization Fund is extremely necessary as it can
make up for the short comings of the PPP loans.
3.2

Why the PPP “failed”

This section of the paper will focus on the shortcomings of the PPP policies, and examine
why the program was not as successful as it was intended to be. Before beginning to analyze the
policies of the program or the distribution process of the loans, the paper brings to attention a
core flaw to the program in its creation – the amount in funding. With over 30 million small
businesses91 in the United States (2019), of which a quarter had temporarily shut down and 11%
were on the verge of closing permanently,92 a cost upwards of at least $1 trillion93 would have
been necessary to make up for lost revenue for the next three months. Compared to this estimate,
the PPP loan was severely lacking in its total of $349 billion. A look into just how dire
businesses needed this funding can be seen in loan applications received by Bank of America
within the first three days. Accounting for just one lender that participated on the opening day of
the first round of PPP loans, the institution received 177,000 applications from small businesses
collectively requesting for $32.6 billion in loans, representing 10% of the total bailout fund.
An additional flaw in the PPP was its method of distribution through private banks.
Despite the country’s immense resources, the government lacked the necessary infrastructure to
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directly pay firms’ wage bills in a timely fashion.94 Instead, congress had to rely on the country’s
vast network of federally insured private banks to dispense aid in the form of fully forgivable
private-bank loans. However, this method required government provided incentives to encourage
banks to process an enormous number of small-business loan applications, to which participating
banks were able to charge fees between 1-5% on loans dispensed and collect 0.5% interest.
These incentives were not enough to offset the risks of deceit entailed within the application
process as banks were pressured to verify borrower’s loan amount and eligibility, which would
usually require an extensive period of time with 100% confidence, as soon as possible, placing
banking institutions at risk should they accept an ineligible loan. The PPP policy ultimately did
not completely exempt banks from their obligation to verify firms’ eligibility, leading banks
insisting for a raise in interest rates, which the Treasury complied to (raising interest rates to 1%)
on the eve of the program’s launch. Although the action of increasing interest rates attracted
more lenders and participation among banks, it also created financial difficulties for small firms
with monthly costs exceeding the forgivable portion of the government-backed loans.95
Ironically, the program’s insufficient initial funding amount in addition to banks’ fears of
potential liability risks led to the third flaw of the program - favoured loan distribution. In order
to reduce liability risks, banks would lend to existing customers, or businesses that already have
a “business-lending and business-deposit relationship” with the bank. Reliance on financial
intermediaries also posed problems for female owners, business owners of color,96 and the most
94
95
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vulnerable small businesses. Although many small firms had pre-existing relationships withs
lending institutions, the most vulnerable small businesses operate on cash and do not have such
relationships. Such establishments were also unlikely to be well prepared and informed about
policy changes compared to larger, more profitable ones, or “pseudo-small businesses” such as
chain-restaurant franchises (Eric Levitz, 2020). This resulted in the most vulnerable “mom-andpop shops” being left out of the PPP loans.
Aside from the fact that the $349 billion loan was insufficient to support all American
small businesses and left out perhaps the most vulnerable businesses it intended to protect in its
distribution, this paper also examines just how beneficial the program was to businesses that did
receive the loan. As brought up in Chapter 2.2, the primary purpose of the PPP was to protect
workers’ paychecks, incorporating a loan amount that provides a maximum of 2.5 times a
businesses’ average monthly payroll cost. An extremely simple method of calculating PPP
eligibility is:
PPP = 2.5(AMP) where AMP = Average Monthly Payroll
These numbers are problematic for several reasons. Firstly, as the formula implies,
funding would only be able to cover 2.5 months’ worth of payroll costs with no market
indication of business conditions returning to normal after 8 weeks, meaning that businesses
would return to the starting point as soon as government relief was depleted, and return to
furloughing or letting go of employees, raising the issue of whether or not the funding
successfully fulfills its objective of keeping employees on payroll. Secondly, the maximum loan
amount was entirely dependent on one factor – the average monthly payroll. Evidently, a
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mathematical model with monthly payroll as the only factor would result in businesses with
more employees receiving more relief than firms with fewer employees. However, with
businesses such as Shake Shack, a fast-food chain with a market capitalization of $2 billion, to
even the LA Lakers qualifying for millions in PPP loans, the validity of whether or not massive
amounts of PPP funding is a necessity to large businesses must be reconsidered. Perhaps the
fundamental fault within the Paycheck Protection Program can be attributed to its original intent
– keeping employees on payroll. Comparative to putting on a band-aid, providing 8 weeks of
payroll funding can be nothing but a temporary solution. Rather than only focusing on keeping
employees on payroll, a long-term solution placing more of an emphasis on keeping struggling
businesses afloat with a focal point on revenue would not only have kept employees on payroll
but also contain the number of businesses permanently shutting down, rendering the average
monthly payroll as insignificant and accounting for only a portion of what the vulnerable and
struggling businesses need.
The average monthly payroll is not the only factor that plays a role in a business’ monthly
expenditures, and to industries that are not payroll intensive (where payroll expenditures do not
account for the majority of the businesses’ annual expenses) or pay low wages, the loan would
not do much in alleviating the struggles of a business. Such was the case with the most
vulnerable in the food service and accommodations industries where PPP loans accounted for
only 9.8%97 of annual expenditures in restaurants and bars.
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Finally, in order to qualify for loan forgiveness, PPP policies required for at least 60%
(originally 75%) of funding to be spent on payroll. This further exasperates the disparity in the
effectiveness of the program as such a requirement would be ideal for payroll intensive
industries, and consequently difficult for businesses with large operating costs minus labor and
dependent on loan forgiveness.
Conclusion
This paper has examined the structure of both the food service and the accommodations
industry in order to observe how employment would be affected during the pandemic. While
breaking down the demographics of the two industries, taking ethnical and gender disparity into
consideration, it finds that both industries share very similar demographic and wage structure,
and experienced heavy impacts in employment caused by the pandemic. However, due to preexisting infrastructure that supports social distancing safety measures, and the flexibility casual
fast-food chains have in adapting to a more food delivery dependent business model, fast food
chains, in comparison to independent dining restaurants, underwent less of a shock in revenue
and employment and have better hopes of full recovery. In contrast to the food service industry,
while hotels also experienced extreme drops in occupancy rate and revenue, independent hotels,
on account of fewer restrictions in franchising models and management, with a greater flexibility
in adjusting to situations in real time with little lag, reported higher revenues. Furthermore, this
paper analyzed the Paycheck Protection Program and found the loans to be faulty in a multitude
of aspects. In analyzing the program in a theoretical and practical viewpoint, the paper finds the
theoretical intentions of the program to be a short-term and unsustainable temporary solution and
should have focused more on preserving businesses through revenue-based loan calculations
instead of payroll costs. Additionally, the method in which loans were carried out failed to reach
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the very businesses that needed government relief, further exasperating the recovery process of
businesses in industries that contain a certain multitude of minority business owners servicing
low-income communities, such as the food service industry.
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